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Studies of decision-making have shown that attitudes can be 
influenced by choices. One way in which to study these types 
of attitude changes can be through the choice blindness 
paradigm. Choice blindness is the well documented finding 
that people may both fail to notice that the outcome of a 
choice does not correspond to what was intended, and at the 
same time construct coherent arguments in support of the re-
versal of their original choice. However, the temporal persis-
tence of the attitude change induced has not received much 
attention.  In order to investigate the longevity of a choice in-
duced attitude change, as well as if this indeed can be 
achieved through the choice blindness paradigm, a two-day 
experiment was executed. The experiment used political 
statements, to which participants rated their agreement. Par-
ticipants’ attitudes were measured thrice, once before a cov-
ert manipulation of their ratings, and twice with one week 
apart,  after the participants had been presented with what 
they were told were their own ratings, but which in fact were 
the opposite. In addition, the length of justification for an-
swers was added as a factor to see if this would influence the 
persistence of attitude change, since it has been shown that 
longer deliberation time increases attitude polarization. After 
a week, 37%  of the ratings were of the form of attitude rever-
sals,  contrasted with 12%  for control statements, which were 
not manipulated. This provides us with evidence that choice 
induced attitude change has a lasting effect, and that tempo-
rally persistent attitude changes can be induced through 
choice blindness. 
1 Introduction
To change people’s minds and to get them to act or behave in 
a certain way is a fundamental aspect of human social inter-
action. Indeed, every time you are participating in some kind 
of discussion or argument, one of your goals will be to in 
some way change the mind or attitude of the person you are 
interacting with. This thesis is concerned with attitude 
change as a result of choice (see p. 2) (Johansson et al., 2005; 
Johansson et al.,  2014; Taya et al., 2014),  and its primary 
goal is to answer the question whether attitude change in-
duced in the choice blindness paradigm is lasting. The sec-
ondary goal is to measure the effect confabulatory explana-
tions in the choice blindness paradigm has on the strength of 
a choice-induced attitude.
 The remainder of this section will present a brief over-
view of differing conceptions of the nature of attitudes, the 
choice blindness paradigm, attitude change, and the overall 
relevance of this thesis. Section 2 elaborates on an experi-
ment constructed to answer the hypotheses of the thesis, as 
well as some pilot testing. Section 3 will provide a detailed 
review of the method of aforementioned experiment, of 
which the results will be presented in section 4. A discussion 
of these results will follow in section 5.
Attitudes
Attitudes are commonly defined as an evaluation of some 
sort of object (a person, a physical object, an ideology) Petty, 
Priester, & Wegener, 1994; Bohner & Wänke, 2014), 
whereas a preference can be conceived as a particular indi-
vidual’s private attitude toward the object (Lichtenstein & 
Slovic,  2006). On this conception, attitudes are understood as 
the pure phenomenon of any person holding an evaluation of 
an object, while preferences are understood as instantiation 
of this phenomenon in a certain individual. Despite their 
somewhat different meanings, the terms “attitudes” and 
“preferences” will be used interchangeably throughout this 
thesis. Despite a common definition, the exact nature of atti-
tudes and preferences are still much debated. Slovic (1995) 
distinguishes between two types of ways in which one can 
view the nature of preferences. The first view can be called 
the economics approach,  while the second view can been 
called the constructivist approach.
 The first view takes preferences as something that exists 
within us, much like a physical property, and thus can be in-
trospectively perceived and reported. This report can, how-
ever, possibly be somewhat biased. The second view regard-
ing the nature of preferences suggests that they are con-
structed in the moment they are needed or asked for (Slovic, 
1995). An underlying assumption in economic theory is that 
consumers’ preferences are relatively stable traits and thus 
suggests what the consumer needs and wants. However, as is 
evident in numerous studies, preferences are seemingly con-
structed by decision makers within a specific task in a spe-
cific context.  A good example is a soon to be first-time par-
ent in the process of buying a baby carriage. From the outset, 
this person is likely not to have any attitudes regarding a load 
of features of carriages, but will after some exploring of dif-
ferent brands and types of carriages form attitudes concern-
ing weight, portability, and possibly even second-hand value. 
On the other hand, a parent who is out to buy a second car-
riage will already have some existing attitudes toward these 
aspects of baby carriages (Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999). It seems 
that both the economics as well as the constructivist ap-
proach gives an account of the attitude formation process, 
depending on consumers past experience (Hoeffler & Ariely, 
1999; Fischhoff, 1991).
 Apart from evidence indicating that attitudes are con-
structed within the domain of a specific task in a specific 
context, there is also evidence that preferences sometimes 
arise not before an actual decision is made, but rather as a re-
sult of the choice made or the action performed (Ariely & 
Norton, 2008). For example, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
conducted an experiment in which two groups of participants 
were paid two different sums of money (one dollar or 20 dol-
lar) for executing a boring task. They were then asked to lie 
to another person, saying that they thought the task was en-
joyable. After this, the participants then got to rate how much 
they themselves enjoyed the task. The result showed that the 
participants who had been paid one dollar rated the task as 
more enjoyable as opposed to the participants who had been 
paid 20 dollars (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). What this re-
sult shows, according to Ariely and Norton (2008), is that 
when a participant is not paid enough to justify lying, they 
will interpret their action of lying as being a result of their 
own preference, in this case finding enjoyment in a boring 
task.
The free-choice paradigm
A traditional tool in psychological research that deals with 
preferences influenced by choices is the free-choice para-
digm (FCP) (Brehm, 1956). This is an experimental method 
used to show preference change as a result of choice. During 
an FCP experiment a participant is asked to rate two objects 
(cars, paintings, faces) and then choose one of them. After 
choosing, the participant will be asked to rate the objects 
again, resulting in more polarized ratings, meaning that the 
chosen object will be rated higher than before and the re-
jected object will be rated lower than before (Chen & Risen, 
2010). Recently, there has been a debate concerning if this 
phenomenon actually exist, and proponents for the sceptical 
view has raised arguments, based on a statistical flaw in the 
design of FCP-experiments, that what FCP reveals is merely 
already existing preferences instead of preferences induced 
by choice (Chen & Risen, 2009; 2010). However, Egan, 
Bloom, and Santos (2010) provide strong support for the no-
tion that FCP truly induces preferences by letting both young 
children as well as non-human primates choose between ob-
jects for which they cannot be guided by preferences. Not 
only do post-choice ratings suggest an induced preference, 
but also that preferences can be induced through a blind 
choice (Egan, Bloom, & Santos, 2010). A recent study also 
gives support to the notion that FCP even can be used to in-
duce an attitude change over a long period of time. Sharot et 
al. (2012) asked participants to make hypothetical preference 
ratings for different vacation destinations.  After this, they 
were presented with pairs of the already rated destinations, 
and were asked to choose between them. Post-choice rating 
was performed on all the destinations immediately after the 
choices, and once more after two and a half to three years. 
The results showed that the participant’s preferences changed 
in the direction of being more positive toward the chosen al-
ternative and more negative toward the rejected alternative 
both immediately after the choice,  as well as up to three 
years later (Sharot et al., 2012).
 The effect of choice-induced preference change has, to-
gether with the findings of Carlsmith and Festinger (1959), 
often been explained by the theory of cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1962; Brehm, 1956; Chen & Risen, 2010). Cogni-
tive dissonance theory states that when people hold two con-
flicting attitudes (“cognitions”) they will experience an un-
pleasant feeling. People will try to eliminate this feeling by 
altering any of the two conflicting attitudes (Festinger, 1962). 
An alternative explanation of preference change through 
choice in the FCP is self-perception theory (Bem, 1967). 
Self-perception theory holds that the way people get access 
to the mental states underlying their behaviour works the 
same way as how they get access to the mental states under-
lying someone else’s behaviour, through perception. Attitude 
change due to choice is here seen as an interpersonal judge-
ment, explaining someone’s choice as being the result of 
some attitude, but directed at oneself (Bem, 1967). Basically, 
people infer their own attitudes because they observe them-
selves behaving in a way that can only be explained by hav-
ing a certain attitude. The question of which one of these 
theories that most accurately reveal the true nature of choice-
induced preference change is hard to answer, in large part 
because they make very similar predictions (Johansson et al., 
2014). However,  as Johansson and colleagues (2014) points 
out, recent research measuring pupil dilation (Pärnamets et 
al.,  2015a) provides evidence that no underlying “dissonant” 
emotions can be found and be responsible for driving prefer-
ence change. On the other hand, as made evident by Egan, 
Bloom, and Santos’ (2010) research on choice-induced pref-
erence change in young children and non-human primates, 
choice-induced preference change exists in agents possessing 
no elaborate self-based cognitive processes. These findings 
do not,  however, speak in favour of theories of cognitive dis-
sonance either.
 Even though the true nature of choice-induced attitude 
change possibly will be revealed through future research, the 
fact remains that when reviewing research investigating peo-
ple’s awareness of their preference changes, it seems that 
people generally have very little or no introspective access to 
their own cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). One 
recently developed research paradigm that takes advantage of 
this inaccessibility is the choice blindness paradigm (Johans-
son et al., 2005).
Choice Blindness
The choice blindness (CB) effect was first discovered by Jo-
hansson et al.  (2005), and the authors themselves view it as 
an extension of the change blindness effect. Change blind-
ness refers to the finding that under various conditions hu-
mans seem to be virtually blind to changes in their environ-
ment (Rensink, 2002).  What Johansson and colleagues did 
was to investigate the assumption of decision-making theo-
ries that we have access our original intentions when review-
ing the outcome of a choice. In other words, if in a choice be-
tween A and B we choose B,  but receive A as having been 
our choice, we should detect that an error must have taken 
place because we know that we chose B. There are two sides 
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to this “know”. On the one hand, it can be understood as a 
“know” in the sense that we detect an unexpected outcome of 
a choice because it stands in opposition to our intention. On 
the other hand, this “know” can be understood as in the sense 
of remembering choosing B, regardless of underlying inten-
tion.  Regardless of which “know” one adheres to, intuition 
tells us that an unexpected outcome of a choice should be de-
tected. However, Johansson and colleagues (2005) found as a 
result of a cleverly crafted sleight of hand experiment that 
this in fact is not the case. The experiment was built around 
pairs of black and white photographs of women, which were 
shown to participants. The participants got to state which one 
of the currently shown women they found most attractive. 
Sometimes immediately after they had made their choice, the 
chosen photograph was shown again to the participants and 
they were asked to describe the reasons behind their choice. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, sometimes the photograph 
that was shown was the opposite one of the originally chosen 
face. These manipulations of the outcome of the participants’ 
choices resulted in that the participants provided confabula-
tory arguments for justifying and explaining a choice they 
never made. More strikingly, only 26% of the manipulations 
were detected (Johansson et al., 2005).
 Numerous replications with both minor and major altera-
tions to the original experiment design have been conducted 
in the last few years, directed at such diverse topics as taste 
and smell (Hall et al., 2010), finance (McLaughlin & Somer-
ville, 2013), tactile choice (Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thorn-
ton, 2013), and spoken words (Lind et al.,  2014). Among 
these are also CB experiments designed to question and re-
fute the assumption that only a very limited group of political 
voters can be made to switch between party lines (Hall et al., 
2013), as well as revealing how floating our moral attitudes 
are (Hall, Johansson, & Strandberg, 2012). Hall, Johansson, 
and Strandberg (2012) constructed a CB experiment using 
moral principles as stimuli to ask what it really is that differ-
ent kinds of polls and surveys actually measure.  The partici-
pants got to state on 9-point scale how much they agreed 
with certain moral questions. Using a “self-transforming” 
survey, the experimenters then unnoticeably changed the 
meaning of the questions to state the opposite. For example, 
the principle “Even if an action might harm the innocent, it 
can still be morally permissible to perform it” was changed 
to “If an action might harm the innocent, then it is not mor-
ally permissible to perform it”. In other words,  while the par-
ticipant’s original rating remained unchanged, the meaning 
of that rating was reversed. The results showed that more 
than half of these changes remained undetected, and also that 
the participants were able to construct coherent arguments 
supporting the undetected manipulated position (Hall,  Jo-
hansson, & Strandberg, 2012).
 In a similar experiment, Hall et al. (2013) investigated 
how well the outcome of political polls actually corresponds 
with voters’  intentions. To do this, they constructed a paper-
survey based CB experiment using political statements as 
stimuli. These statements were very specific, for example 
“Gasoline taxes should be increased” and “The wealth tax 
was abolished in 2007. It should be reinstated”. The first part 
of the survey asked the participants how politically engaged 
they were and how certain they were in their political view. 
The survey also asked the participants to state their current 
voting intention on a scale ranging from extremely left wing 
to extremely right wing as well as their own certainty of 
these intentions. Then the participants answered the political 
statements by writing an “X” on a horizontal axis ranging 
from “Absolutely disagree” to “Absolutely agree”. While the 
participants were occupied with filling in their answers, the 
experimenters secretly filled out an answer sheet identical to 
the one the participants had, but in a way as to make the total 
sum of the answers resulting in an endorsement of the politi-
cal camp opposite to the one the participants previously had 
stated as object of their current voting intention. In other 
words, if a participant had stated an intention of voting left 
wing, the experimenters filled in the answers corresponding 
with views usually associated with voting right wing. Using 
sleight of hand, the experimenters then unnoticeably replaced 
the participants’ original answers with the “manipulated” 
ones. Next, Hall and colleagues asked the participants to ex-
plain their choices regarding some of the statements, result-
ing in the participants justifying a choice they never made. 
After this, the answers were calculated in collaboration with 
the participants resulting in a score for both left and ring 
wing, indicating their voting intention based on their answers 
to the 12 statements. Finally, the participants were asked to 
once more state their current voting intention. The results 
showed that only 22% of the manipulations were detected, 
and that as many as 48% of the participants were open to a 
coalition shift. This stands in contrast to the generally ac-
cepted estimation that only 10% of the voters are open to a 
coalition shift (Hall et al., 2013). The result regarding voting 
intention is especially interesting, since it not only shows that 
the majority of the participants were unable to detect ma-
nipulations of their own choices, but furthermore, is suggests 
that CB can be used to influence future choice.  Not only can 
people construct coherent arguments to justify a choice they 
never made, it also seems that not detecting a manipulation 
can have an effect on attitudes themselves.
 What these studies further have shown is that we do not 
seem to have as unrestricted access to our own preferences as 
one might imagine, and that we unconsciously try to explain 
or justify the world we are exposed to. Another possible con-
clusion one can draw from the results presented above is that 
our attitudes seem to be constructivist (Slovic, 1995) rather 
than economic, and importantly so regarding topics that we 
normally assume to be quite significant (e.g. morals and poli-
tics).
Attitude change
One question, which follows from the changes in voting in-
tention found in Hall et al. (2013), is whether CB can be used 
as a tool to study preference change. This has been explored 
empirically in three different studies (Johansson et al., 2014; 
Taya et al., 2014; Pärnamets et al., 2015b). In trying to meet 
criticism raised by Chen and Risen (2010) regarding the va-
lidity of FCP, Johansson et al. (2014) used a CB setting simi-
lar to the first CB study from 2005 was used, effectively 
showing that the CB paradigm can be thought of as a kind 
FCP. Chen and Risen (2010) theorize that FCP will produce 
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spreading in the evaluation of alternatives even if attitudes 
remain the same. Suggestions for improving the FCP are pre-
sented,  among others,  manipulating the choices that people 
make, and at the same time avoiding to directly manipulate 
peoples attitudes (Chen & Risen, 2010). As Johansson and 
colleagues (2014) point out, this seems to be just what CB 
does. Johansson and colleagues (2014) used photographs of 
female faces, which were shown in pairs to the participants, 
who then had to decide which face of each pair they found 
most attractive.  Sometimes, the pairs were presented to the 
participant immediately after the choice and the participant 
got to explain their choice. Half of these pairs were manipu-
lated. After explaining their choice, the participants rated 
both faces in each pair individually. Once all face pairs had 
been shown, the participants got to see them again and rate 
which face they preferred, and after this they got to rate each 
face again. The results show that the faces that originally got 
rejected but being objects of CB manipulation, were pre-
ferred during the second set of choices, as well as that the 
originally rejected faces were rated higher in the last choice 
compared to the first. This provides a strong indication that 
CB can be used to produce preference change in the same 
way as FCP, and also understood as an updated version of the 
classic FCP (Johansson et al., 2014). Similarly, Pärnamets 
and colleagues (2015b) shows that preference change can be 
induced through CB in groups of two as well as in individu-
als, by measuring choice consistency. In short, believing that 
you chose some thing seems, in light of these findings, have 
the same effect on future choices as if you actually chose it.
 The studies presented above indicate that CB in fact can 
be used as tool for changing people’s preferences, as well as 
a tool for studying preference change through choice. These 
studies do not, however, provide any indication as to how 
lasting these choice induced preference changes are. Without 
any complete understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
both FCP and CB, this is a matter in need of further inquiry. 
In a recent study, Taya and colleagues (2014) investigated 
this matter in the context of a two-day CB experiment. The 
design of the CB experiment conducted by Taya and col-
leagues (2014) was in some respects very similar to the one 
conducted by Johansson and colleagues (2014): pairs of fe-
male faces were shown to the participants who got to state 
which one of the faces they found most attractive.  After each 
choice the participants got to state how certain they where. 
Sometimes after choosing,  the photographs were shown 
again and the participants were asked to explain their choice. 
On half of these trials, a CB manipulation occurred. Follow-
ing this, the participants got to rate the attractiveness of each 
face individually. After this followed a similarity rating in 
which the participants got to rate the similarity of each face 
pair. At the end of the first session (e.g.  day one of the ex-
periment) all participants were fully debriefed.  The second 
session occurred around two weeks after the first and con-
sisted of a web-based re-evaluation of attractiveness of all 
faces.   The results indicate a short-term preference change as 
a result of the CB manipulation but no long-term effect (Taya 
et al., 2014).
 The first,  basic finding of this study is that it replicates 
the preference change, as measured through ratings, found in 
previous work (Johansson et al., 2014). The second finding 
presented in this study is that although there is indeed a 
measurable short-term attitude change as a result of CB, this 
effect disappears within two weeks.  However, when taking 
into account that the participants were fully debriefed after 
the experiment was concluded, the absence of any long-term 
effect of CB on attitude change comes as no surprise. If the 
participants had been debriefed after the first round of 
choices and before the re-evaluation, the chance of an effect 
even for the short-term would indeed be slim,  since the 
whole point of using CB to induce attitude change is to make 
the participants believe that they themselves made the 
choice. With as big a confound as this, there is little reason to 
take the result of Taya and colleagues (2014) as any clear in-
dication as to the lasting effects of choice induced preference 
change, or for that matter, the effects of using CB to induced 
preference change. This question is, in other words, still 
open.
 An aspect of the CB paradigm which have not yet re-
ceived much attention is that of the effects of confabulation 
on new or altered attitudes.
Confabulation
In any CB experiment,  confabulation is a key element. Con-
fabulation refers to the phenomenon of unconsciously fabri-
cating aspects of oneself or the world without any deceptive 
intentions (Fotopoulou, Conway, & Solms, 2007). In the CB 
paradigm, a confabulatory explanation denotes the justifica-
tion or explanation for a choice actually never made (e.g.  an 
undetected manipulation).  According to the elaboration like-
lihood model of persuasion (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995), a theory accounting for at-
titude formation and change, the strength of an attitude can 
be predicted by the amount of issue-relevant thinking a per-
son has spent on the object (Petty, Haugvedt, & Smith, 
1995). The ELM builds on literature concerning attitude per-
sistence and suggests that attitude change can be seen as re-
sulting from two different kinds of persuasion.  The first is 
persuasion by perceptual cues, not involving any careful de-
liberation as to the merits of a specific argument. The second 
is careful and issue-relevant consideration of a specific ar-
gument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). By this view, attitude 
change as a result of issue-relevant thinking can be seen as a 
result of self-persuasion. However, there seems to be more to 
this persuasion process than just time and relevance of 
thought.  Petty, Briñol, and Tormala (2002) explored the im-
portance of confidence in one’s own thoughts in the persua-
sion process,  and found that amount of confidence one has 
regarding thoughts directed at an object can both increase 
and decrease persuasion, depending on if the thoughts them-
selves are positive (increase in persuasion) or negative (de-
crease in persuasion).
 In a related study, Clarkson, Tormala, and Leone (2011) 
found that if someone gets to think about some object for up 
to 300 s, the more will their confidence regarding their own 
attitudes directed at this object increase, and their attitudes 
will become more polarized. Shorter deliberation time (60 s) 
was shown to lead to lower confidence and attitude depolari-
zation, as did longer deliberation time (>300 s) deliberation 
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time (Clarkson, Tormala, & Leone, 2011). So there seems to 
be a correlation between the time spent thinking about an ob-
ject and the amount of confidence in these thought on the one 
hand, and the amount of confidence in one’s thoughts regard-
ing an object and the amount of polarization of attitude as 
well as attitude strength on the other. If these effects of think-
ing are applicable to verbal reasoning, then there should be a 
correlation between the amount of explaining of a choice 
made by a participant in a CB setting and the strength of a 
preference induced by CB.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis for this thesis is twofold. Firstly, (H1a) 
choice blindness can be used to change people’s political atti-
tudes immediately following a manipulation, and, (H1b) over 
an extended period of time.  Secondly, (H2) the new attitude 
will strengthen as a function of the length of confabulation.
Present study
This study primarily investigates the longevity of political 
preferences induced through choice, and whether CB can be 
used as a tool for inducing these preferences. Three main 
reasons lay behind the decision to use politics as items for 
manipulation: Firstly, previous research has already con-
cluded that one can successfully perform CB manipulations 
on political statements. Secondly, an early iteration of the 
experiment design aimed at being able to measure a general 
attitude-change effect regarding one field of politics as being 
a result of manipulations of specific questions. Thirdly, it 
was reasoned best to use stimuli items for which the partici-
pants hold clear and possibly strong attitudes. The secondary 
question this study investigates is whether the length of con-
fabulatory explanations in the CB paradigm has any impact 
on the strength of an altered or newly formed attitude.
Importance of study
Showing whether a choice can change peoples’ political atti-
tudes in the long-term, and that this can be done through CB 
is important and relevant for a number of reasons in many 
different areas of research. For one, it would provide more 
support of the robustness of choice induced attitude change, 
subsequently rejecting the objection of Chen and Risen 
(2010) regarding FCP even more. The most obvious outcome 
is of course that it would provide support for the validity of 
using CB as a tool for lasting attitude change, instead of just 
a way to make visible the floating nature of attitudes.  This 
would for example in turn provide more evidence for the 
suggestion that the economics and the constructivist ap-
proach (Slovic, 1995) both provide an explanation for the na-
ture of attitudes. That attitudes change as a result of choice 
has, as we have seen, been shown extensively in FCP re-
search,  but the more positively regarded object has always 
been the initially chosen one. In other words, the previously 
shown attitude changes induced through the FCP has been a 
kind of attitude reinforcement, as opposed to attitude rever-
sal. If one, on the other hand, could use CB as a way to in-
duce a long-lasting attitude change, the more positively re-
garded object would of course be the one not initially chosen, 
resulting in a long-lasting attitude reversal.
 Maybe the most obvious practical applications of this 
knowledge would be in the area of advertisement and politi-
cal campaigning, since these are areas already devoted to try-
ing to cleverly change people’s attitudes.
 Showing that the length of confabulation regarding an 
undetected manipulated choice has an effect on the strength 
of a new attitude will give more weight to ELM, as well as to 
theories accounting for preference reversals as being a prod-
uct of some kind of self-perception, as opposed to cognitive 
dissonance.
2 Experimental design and pilot testing
To test the temporal persistence of a choice induced attitude 
change in a CB environment, as well as, the effect of con-
fabulation length on the strength of the new attitude,  a week-
long two-session CB experiment was constructed. The first 
session involved initial ratings, CB manipulation, and a sec-
ond round of ratings. Subjects were split into two groups 
where they were asked for different lengths of confabulatory 
explanations for their ratings. The second session involved a 
re-choosing of the previous stimuli without any manipulation 
or explanation, as well as, a debriefing for both sessions. On 
account of time constraints the longest time between the two 
sessions in which the experiment was executed was set to 
approximately seven days. To control for possible confounds 
it was reasoned that the two days should, if possible, take 
place at the same location using the same material. Before 
reaching its final form, however, the experimental design 
went through a number of different iterations and pilot tests.
Stimuli and attitude measures in pilot 1 and 2
The stimuli used for the first pilot study were political state-
ments divided into three groups, each consisting of six 
statements. These groups concerned three different areas; 
school politics, health care, and migration. Examples of the 
statements are: “The salary for nurses should increase sig-
nificantly” or “Refugees without papers should have the 
same right to Swedish welfare as all other Swedish resi-
dents”.  For each statement, participants rated how much they 
agreed with that statement on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 
equalled total disagreement and 8 equalled total agreement. 
Half of the statements in each group were weighted posi-
tively and the other half negatively. The effect being that if, 
for example, you are extremely liberal with regard to migra-
tion politics, you would answer three of the questions con-
cerning migration with “1”,  and the other three with “8”. 
This was meant to minimize the risk of the participants de-
tecting a pattern in their own answers. Additionally, the 
statements were created with the hope of saying something 
about how important participants thought each area of poli-
tics was in regard to how tax revenue ought to be distributed 
among them. The reason for this design, and also for choos-
ing to work with statements revealing political attitudes was 
on account of an assumption of their inherent transferability. 
This transferability means that depending on what one’s atti-
tude is regarding a set of different statements concerning a 
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specific area or subject, these attitudes will have an impact 
on one’s overall attitude regarding this specific area or sub-
ject. To illustrate, if you believe that a strong welfare pro-
gram is an important part of a well-functional state, you are 
also likely to believe that its inhabitants should pay taxes 
covering parts of the costs that this welfare entails. Transfer-
ability would make it possible to validate a preference 
change in more ways than just asking the previously unde-
tected manipulated question again. If a participant has been 
led to believe that their attitude is that there are no benefits to 
be found in letting immigrants into the country, this partici-
pant would be expected, on the assumption of transferability, 
to prefer that the state also should spend less money on mi-
gration. If this assumption proved to be warranted, it would 
allow for making a stronger case that CB can induce an atti-
tude reversal, and not only altering disposition to answer a 
specific question in a certain way. To exploit this assumed 
transfer effect, four additional measures of political attitudes 
were introduced. One measure concerned all three subareas, 
one concerned only medical care, one concerned only educa-
tion, and one concerned only migration politics.
 The first additional attitude measure was a tax distribu-
tion task. The participants were told that a new bill had been 
passed, effectively giving every taxpayer more authority 
concerning how their taxes should be spent in the three areas 
of schools, health care, and migration. They were then asked 
to distribute 100 SEK over these three areas. The underlying 
assumption was that the participant’s answers on the political 
statements should correlate with how they chose to distribute 
the money.
 The second attitude measure concerned only health care. 
The participants received information about a vision pre-
sented by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions (“Sveriges kommuner och landsting”).  According to 
this vision, 70% of all medical patients should have received 
care within 60 days of their first visit. In addition, the par-
ticipants were told that only one out of 21 local authorities in 
Sweden managed to satisfy this. The participants’  task was to 
state if they thought this target goal was too high or too low, 
and also to write in per cent what they thought a reasonable 
target should be. The assumption was that the answer to this 
question would correlate with how the participants had an-
swered on the questions regarding medical care, where a par-
ticipant who thought the target was too low would rate the 
statements regarding medical care higher than a participant 
who thought the target was too high.
 The third attitude measure focused on the Swedish Scho-
lastic Aptitude Test (“Högskoleprovet”). The participants re-
ceived information that all students who applied to the 
teacher education programme with Swedish as their main 
subject, using their score on the aptitude test, were admitted. 
The participants were also told that the lowest scoring admit-
ted student had a test score of 0.3 (2.0 is highest) and that the 
mean score is 0.9. They were also told that the lowest score 
for being admitted to the nurse education was 1.2.  The par-
ticipants were asked to take a stand concerning if there 
should be some kind of threshold for being admitted to the 
teacher education, and to answer with a number ranging from 
0.0 to 2.0. The correlation assumed to be found here was that 
if one answers the statements concerning school politics in a 
way that corresponds with the school system receiving more 
funds one should also be more inclined to state some kind of 
threshold.  The fourth measure was constructed to measure at-
titudes regarding migration. The participants received infor-
mation on how many refugees Sweden, in agreement with 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, grants 
asylum to each year (1900 refugees), and were asked to rate 
if this was too many or too few, and to write how many refu-
gees at least should be granted asylum in Sweden each year. 
The assumed correlation here was that if you show a more 
liberal stance in regard to migration, this should correlate 
with the proposed refugee quota.
 The results of the first pilot study showed that there was 
no correlation between the answers on the political state-
ments on the one hand and the answers on the four attitude 
measurers on the other. Another finding of the pilot was that, 
overall, the answers to the political statements generally 
seemed to be too polarized (meaning that the answers gener-
ally where very close to the extremes 1 and 8) to be able to 
hope to make any undetected manipulations using those 
statements in the future main study. In hope of finding a cor-
relation between the stimuli and the additional attitude meas-
ure, a reworking of the stimulus material and the general atti-
tude measure was made for a second pilot.
Evaluation.  No correlation could be found between how im-
portant the participants in the first pilot study thought each of 
the three areas of politics were and how they were willing to 
spend their tax money. For this reason, the second pilot study 
shifted focus to the importance of the political questions 
themselves. Instead of asking the participants how much they 
agreed with a certain statement,  the second pilot asked the 
participants to rate how important they thought certain politi-
cal issues were. Examples of the type of stimuli used for the 
second pilot are “Whether specialist medical care should be 
nationalized is an important question” or “The structure and 
quality of the teacher education is an important question” 
(see Appendix A). As in the previous pilot,  the participants 
got to rate how much they agreed with the statement on a 
scale from 1 to 8. Further, the group of questions concerning 
migration were dropped altogether because of the overall po-
larization of the answers, and issues regarding environmental 
politics were used instead. Instead of measuring how impor-
tant the participants thought each area of politics were using 
the tax distribution task, the participants got to rate the im-
portance of the three areas environment, schools,  and health 
care. Again, no correlation was found between the answers to 
the stimulus material and how the three political areas were 
rated. Due to the time constraints involved in a master’s the-
sis,  the idea of finding a measureable transferability between 
answers to singular statements and more general attitudes re-
garding whole areas of politics had to be put on the shelf for 
the present study.
Pilot using Choice Blindness
The CB pilot was the final step in the construction of the ex-
periment,  and the main motivation behind it was to evaluate 
the stimulus material in regard to CB manipulation. In other 
words, to see which stimuli items could successfully be used 
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as targets for possible manipulations. In addition to this,  the 
design was evaluated as a whole to learn if there was any-
thing in it that did not work, if the stimuli items made sense 
to the participants, and to gain insight to the participant’s 
overall impression of the experiment.
Participants. 15 volunteers (10 female) in the ages ranging 
from 19 to 30 (M = 22.6, SD = 2.8) participated in the pilot. 
These were approached at the LUX building at Lund Univer-
sity and were asked if they would like to answer a few ques-
tions, after which they would get to talk about their answers. 
After the pilot, all participants were fully debriefed, gave in-
formed consent, and received a gift card at Café LUX worth 
40 SEK.
Materials and procedure. Although the two pilot studies of 
the proposed stimuli did not yield any results in regards to 
the proposed additional attitude measure, it gave an indica-
tion of which of the political statements and issues that pos-
sibly could be used for a CB experiment. The choice of stim-
uli for the CB-pilot was based on how the participants had 
answered the statements in the two previous pilots. An as 
even spread as possible from 1 to 8 were considered most op-
timal in regards to manipulation. Thus, twelve statements 
with the most even spread where chosen, resulting in four 
statements in each subcategory of health care, school-, and 
environmental politics. Since the idea of an additional atti-
tude measure had been dropped, the kind of meta-statements 
used in the previous pilot was dropped as well,  and once 
more the stimuli consisted of political statements (see Ap-
pendix B).
 To try to minimize the polarization of the answers,  this 
time the statements were given a more specific form. For ex-
ample, the first pilot one item had been “Sweden should na-
tionalize specialist medical care”. Now, instead, it was for-
mulated as: “In order to guarantee equal care across the 
whole country, specialist medical care should be nationalized 
instead of being run by local authorities. A lot of smaller es-
tablishments could shut down in order to make it easier for 
the care to be run centrally, which in turn would result in 
fewer, more powerful specialist care establishments with 
higher capacity”. The underlying assumption for this change 
was that the more information each stimuli item contains, the 
more the participants will have to think about and weigh dif-
ferent arguments concerning the underlying political issue, 
for against each other, thus resulting in less polarization of 
the answers, and hopefully a lower detection rate. This as-
sumption is based o the idea that ease of confabulation is in 
part based on the accessibility of arguments for or against 
statements.
 All 12 statements were implemented in a tablet applica-
tion,  which randomized the order of the statements. During 
the pilot test, each participant first answered all questions by 
writing an “X” somewhere on a horizontal axis ranging from 
“Disagree completely” to “Agree completely”. After this, 
they were presented with the four statements concerning 
school politics and the four statements concerning environ-
mental politics in randomized order. Two randomized an-
swers from each category had now been manipulated across 
the midpoint of the axis, and the participants were asked to 
explain their choices. At this point, the participants had been 
divided into two conditions. Participants in the first condition 
(C1) were asked to explain their choices with only one sen-
tence, while the participants in the second condition (C2) 
were asked to explain their choices as thoroughly as possible. 
If the participants indicated that the answers that were show-
ing did not correspond with their view, they were told that 
they could now change the answers. After this, all partici-
pants were asked a series of questions concerning if they had 
understood what was expected of them, if they found any 
stimuli items difficult to understand, and their impression of 
the experiment. After the interview all participants were fully 
debriefed, gave informed consent and received their pay-
ment.
Results of Choice Blindness pilot. Of all manipulated an-
swers, 75% were changed by the participants, and were cate-
gorized as detected. Out of all stimuli items, two each in the 
subcategories of school- and environmental politics were 
chosen as targets for manipulation in the experiment on ac-
count of them being the least detected manipulated items. 
The way of dividing the participants into the two different 
confabulation conditions did not work as expected. Some of 
the participants in C1 provided more than one sentence and 
some of the participants in C2 provided not much more than 
one sentence, even though encouraged by the experimenter 
to elaborate. Because of this, it would be impossible to dif-
ferentiate between possible effects on the strength of the atti-
tudes the length of confabulation could have. Thus, a rework-
ing of the experimental design was in this respect needed.
3 Method of the main experiment
The experiment took place in the Swedish city of Lund be-
tween the 30 of March and the 8 of June 2015. The experi-
menters were David Sivén, master’s student, and Thomas 
Strandberg, Phd student, from the department of Cognitive 
Science at Lund University.
Participants
In total, 141 paid volunteers participated in the experiment. 
The data recorded from 48 participants had to be discarded 
due to a mishap with the recorded data, bugs while interact-
ing with the tablet application,  or because of not returning for 
T3. For the analysis, 93 paid volunteers (57 female) in the 
ages 18 to 40 (M = 23.16, SD = 3.18) remained. These were 
recruited at the LUX building at Lund University.  All partici-
pants received a full debriefing, gave informed consent to 
their data being used, and received either two cinema vouch-
ers or one cinema voucher and a gift card at Café LUX worth 
40 SEK, as payment. The 93 participants used for the analy-
sis returned six (M = 6.25, SD = 1.82) days later for the sec-
ond session of the experiment. The participants who choose 
not to come back received a full debriefing over e-mail or 
text message. They did not, however,  get to sign a form of 
consent.  Consequently, these participants were not included 
in any form of analysis, and their data was discarded.
Materials
For registering answers and manipulating the participants’ 
choices, a web-based survey application running on a tablet 
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was used (Fig. 1). This application presents political state-
ments (see Appendix B) one at a time in a randomized order. 
The political statements are,  as in the pilot using CB, very 
specific, and divided into the three subcategories of medical 
care, school politics, and environmental politics.  The four 
manipulable target statements were chosen on account of the 
low detection rates the manipulated answers to these state-
ments had during the CB pilot study. These four statements 
were:
(1) “The government should subsidize purchases of energy 
efficient major household appliances. These subsidizes 
would be financed by an excise on out-dated and from 
an energy consumption perspective ineffective technol-
ogy.”
(2) “Gasoline tax for individual citizens should be based on 
registered address. For a person who for instance lives 
in a larger city with a well-developed system for public 
transportation (and thus is not that dependent on a car), 
the gasoline tax should be higher than for a person who 
lives in a rural area. This should not include businesses 
in metropolitan areas that are dependent on motor vehi-
cles.”
(3) “The Swedish elementary school should be re-
nationalized. Apart from the fact that local municipali-
ties would loose much, albeit not all, influence, a re-
nationalization would mean that the state becomes head 
of the school and assumes the responsibility for re-
source allocation and quality assurance.”
(4) “Help with homework after school hours should be of-
fered by all schools and be free for all elementary 
school students, irrespective of school results and fam-
ily situation.”
Apart from the survey application, two different paper-based 
surveys (S1 and S2 (see Appendix C)) were used for the 
measuring of the attitudes post-CB, and for the measuring of 
the attitudes after a week, respectively. These surveys both 
had 12 statements each, out of which the four possible targets 
for manipulation as well as two statements regarding medical 
care remained exactly the same in both surveys. The remain-
ing six statements in both surveys were unique for each sur-
vey, and neither of them had been used in the tablet applica-
tion.  Finally, an audio recorder was used to record the con-
fabulatory explanations of the manipulated answers.
Experimental task
The statements are answered by writing an X somewhere on 
a horizontal axis ranging from 0% to 100%, respectively 
corresponding to “Disagree completely” and “Agree com-
pletely”. The midpoint of the axis, at 50%, corresponds to 
having no opinion or to uncertainty. Each political statement 
is followed by the secondary question “How certain are you 
about your own opinion regarding this matter?” followed by 
an axis ranging from 0% to 100%, respectively correspond-
ing to “Extremely uncertain” and “Extremely certain”. The 
reason for incorporating the secondary question was that if it 
turns out that no long lasting effect of the manipulations of 
the participants’  attitudes can be found,  maybe an effect on 
the participants’ certainty regarding their own attitudes can 
be found instead. After all 12 statements and secondary ques-
tions have been answered, the application presents two target 
statements from the subcategory of school politics and two 
target statements from the subcategory environmental poli-
tics again as well as the participants’ answers to these state-
ments. These statements are presented in a randomized order 
one at a time. One of the two target statements in each sub-
category have at this point been randomly picked out and 
manipulated by the application by moving the X written on 
the axis across the midline. 
 To keep the detection rate at a reasonable level, the X is 
moved by the application to the other side of the axis and 
placed either somewhere between 15% and 35% or between 
65% and 85%. The reason for not moving them closer to the 
middle than this is to manipulate the participants into believ-
ing that they have a somewhat clear attitude for or against the 
statement. X’s written between 35% and 65% on the axis are 
not manipulated, since these X’s corresponds to not having a 
Figure 1. The CB application in  action. To the left: Initial rating of a manipulable statement. The X on the upper axis corresponds with 
agreeing with the statement. The X on the lower axis corresponds to neutral confidence regarding the raters attitude.
To the right: After the 12 statements  have been answered. The application has now moved the X to correspond with not agreeing with the 
statement.
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strong enough opinion or uncertainty. X’s written between 0–
15% and between 85–100% are not manipulated, since ma-
nipulations of these answers were thought to be too detect-
able. 
Procedure
Recruitment. The participants were approached by the ex-
perimenters who introduced themselves as coming from the 
Department of Philosophy at Lund University, stating that 
they were conducting a study investigating different kinds of 
measurements of political attitudes, and how they correlate. 
The participants were asked if they were willing to partake 
on two occasions separated by a week. Each participant was 
guaranteed total anonymity throughout the study, and that 
they would as payment receive with two cinema vouchers.
First session. The first session consisted of three subtasks: 
initial rating, interaction with manipulated answers, and post-
CB rating (Fig. 2). First the participant was asked to answer 
12 statements (T1) on a tablet, by marking an X along an 
axis in response to each statement. The experimenter also 
made it clear that the ends of the axis did not represent 
“Disagree/Agree” or “No/Yes”, but rather two extremes of a 
spectrum. This was done to maximize possible manipulable 
answers, the assumption being that it is much easier to spot a 
manipulation if original X was on the far end of the axis 
rather than somewhere along the axis. When sure that the 
participant understood what was going to happen, the ex-
perimenter left the room to let the participant respond to the 
statements with as few distractions as possible. Before leav-
ing the room, the experimenter asked the participant to call 
for him after answering all 12 questions. This instruction was 
also presented by the application when the 12 statements had 
been answered.
 Upon returning to the room, the experimenter explained 
the second subtask (the interaction phase; C1/C2). During 
this subtask, unbeknownst to the participants, the choice 
blindness manipulation took place. Each participant was told 
that the tablet would now randomly present four of the 12 
statements and also the participants’ answers to each of these 
statements. Two of these answers had now secretly been ma-
nipulated by the survey application running on the tablet. To 
measure the effect of the length of confabulation on the tem-
poral extent of the attitude change, the participant was as-
signed one of two conditions. In one of the conditions (C1), 
the participant was asked to read aloud each statement as 
they appeared on the tablet, state were on the axis they had 
written their X and if this meant that they agreed or dis-
agreed. In the other condition (C2), the participant was asked 
to read aloud each statement as they appeared on the tablet, 
state were on the axis they had written their X and if this 
meant that they agreed or disagreed, as well as to as thor-
oughly as possible account for the reasons behind the answer.
 The intended effect of explicitly asking the participants to 
state where on the axis they had written their X was to make 
sure that they would be thinking about the X’s as their own, 
and no one else’s. Hopefully, this would result in providing 
the participants with optimal conditions under which to de-
tect the manipulations, and at the same time strengthen the 
possible effects of an undetected manipulation. By control-
ling for the confabulation condition in this manner, the way 
in which to divide the participants into C1 and C2 was now 
also solved, since there is a clear distinction between stating 
that a manipulated X belongs to oneself,  which indeed is a 
confabulation, and to in addition to this provide an explana-
tion justifying the position of the X, even if this explanation 
should happen to be condensed into only one sentence. While 
performing the second subtask, all participants were know-
ingly and willingly recorded by an audio recorder. In the 
event of a participant clearly indicating that the answer they 
saw did not correspond with their view, they were told that 
they could change their answer if they wanted to, after which 
they could base their explanation on the position of the X in 
the now corrected position.
 The third subtask (T2) consisted of the participant an-
swering a survey (either S1 or S2) very similar to the one 
they had previously answered on the tablet, only it was in the 
Figure 2. A flowchart illustrating the procedure of the experiment. In T1, the participants  make the initial  ratings. In the interaction phase, 
they get to review their answers to the four target statements, out of which two have been manipulated, either with a minimal amount of 
confabulation (C1), or with an unlimited  amount of confabulation (C2). In T2, the participants rate the four target statements  again, together 
with  8 new statements. Approximately a week later, in T3, the participants rate the four target statements once more, together with a new set 
of 8 new statements. After this, they get a full debriefing, gives informed consent, and receive payment (Deb).
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form of a traditional pen-and-paper survey. Six of the 12 
statements were new to the participants, but the four possible 
target statements as well as two statements concerning medi-
cal care, remained in the exact same form as in the tablet ap-
plication. The participants were told that the motivation be-
hind this additional survey was to measure if there was any 
difference in answers if a survey was conducted electroni-
cally or physically. Further, the participants were told that it 
was likely that some of the statements that they had an-
swered on the tablet also would be included in the paper sur-
vey, since they were all randomly selected from the same 
bank of statements. Upon completion of this third subtask, 
the experimenter and the participant agreed on a time and 
date for the second session, preferably seven days later or as 
close to seven days as possible.
Second session. The second session (T3) took place seven 
(M = 7.03, SD 1.60) days after the first (T1). The participants 
were now asked to fill out an additional survey (if S1 the last 
time, now S2,  and vice versa) similar to the one they had 
filled out the previous week. Upon completion, the partici-
pants were fully debriefed, signed a form of consent,  and re-
ceived payment.
Analysis and measures
Since the participants were divided into two different groups 
who received different treatments, the experiment is, in re-
spect to H2, one with a between-subjects design. The main 
advantage of designing an experiment in this way is that the 
independent variable (in this case the length of confabula-
tion) can be isolated,  resulting in minimal contamination by 
other variables. The obvious disadvantage with a between-
subject design of this sort is that the population receiving the 
same treatment is considerably lower than that of the whole 
population of subjects. In this case the participants received 
one of two possible treatments, resulting in two smaller ana-
lysable groups.  In respect to H1a and H1b, the experiment 
can be seen as a within-subjects experiment, since these hy-
potheses only predicts that CB can be used to induce attitude 
change regarding political attitudes both immediately after a 
manipulation as well as a week later, irrespective of treat-
ment.
 All the manipulated answers were either categorized as 
detected or undetected, based on if the participants changed 
the position of the X answering the manipulated questions 
during the second subtask (T1). A change/correction was 
categorized as a detected manipulation, whereas a manipu-
lated answer not changed by the participants was categorized 
as an undetected manipulation. For the manipulated answers, 
each rating in T2 and T3 in the direction of the manipulated 
rating, with a significant difference from T1 was categorized 
as an attitude change. An attitude change across the midpoint 
of the axis was categorized as an attitude reversal.  To meas-
ure the effect the two lengths of confabulation had on the at-
titude change, the total means between attitude changes in 
C1 and C2 was compared. Analysis and testing on the re-
corded data was mainly carried out using t-tests, as well as 
linear regression models. The method of analysis was chosen 
on account of the clarity and straightforward manner in 
which the results of these tests are presented.
 All ratings in this section are stated in mm, in relation to a 
scale from 0 to 100. In total, 55 participants were assigned 
the condition C2 (detailed confabulation), and 38 participants 
were assigned the condition C1 (minimal amount of confabu-
lation). An individual question will henceforth be denoted as 
a “trial”, a “NM-trial” (non-manipulated) is to be understood 
as a control question, and a “M-trial” is to be understood as a 
question manipulated in the interaction phase.
4 Results
Differences in ratings (NM-trials)
For the 186 NM-trials, the total difference in ratings between 
T1 and T2, T2 and T3,  and between T1 and T3, were shown 
with t-tests not to be significant (T1 vs T2 (Mdiff = -1.63, 95% 
CI [-4.11, 0.84], t129 = -1.30, p = .579, d = -0.11), T2 vs T3 
(Mdiff = 0.62, 95% CI [-1.61, 2.86], t122 = 0.55, p = .581, d = 
0.04), T1 vs T3 (Mdiff = -1.59, 95% CI [-4.33, 1.15], t122 = 
-1.14, p = .579, d = -0.10). See Figure 3 for an illustration of 
these differences in ratings.
Detections
Out of all 186 M-trials,  90 (48%) were detected and cor-
rected by the participants, resulting in 96 non-detected M-
trials.
Differences in ratings (detected M-trials)
For the detected M-trials, the difference in ratings in the di-
rection of the manipulations (i.e. the change in attitude re-
garding a certain statement) between T1 and T2, and between 
T1 and T3, were not significant (T1 VS T2 (Mdiff = 1.92, 95% 
CI [-0.75, 4.60], t89 = 1.42, p = .092, d = 0.15), T1 VS T3 
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Figure 3. A box-and-whisker plot depicting the distributions 
of differences in ratings of NM-trials between the three 
times of rating (T1, T2, T3). The notches display a 95% 
confidence interval around the median.
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(Mdiff = -0.23, 95% CI [-2.88, 2.40], t89 = -0.17, p = .643, d = 
-0.01)). This result is illustrated in Figure 4.
Differences in ratings (non-detected M-trials)
A t-test on the participants’ ratings on the non-detected M-
trials in T2 and T3 compared to the answers in T1 shows a 
significant movement in the direction of the manipulations 
(T2 VS T1 (Mdiff = 26.05, 95% CI [22.25, 29.86], t92 = 13.59, 
p < .001,  d = 1.41), T3 VS T1 (Mdiff = 13.69, 95% CI [9.52, 
17.87], t92 = 6.51, p < .001, d = 0.67)). A t-test between the 
difference in ratings between T1 and T2 for non-detected M-
trials, and the difference in ratings between T3 and T1 for 
non-detected M-trials shows a significant difference (Mdiff = 
12.35,  95% CI [8.30, 16.41], t92 = 6.05, p < .001, d = 0.62). 
This result is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Effect of confabulatory condition
In order to assess the effect of confabulatory condition on the 
changes in ratings, a linear regression analysis was con-
ducted examining the relationship between detection and ex-
perimental condition. One model was fit for the difference 
between T1 and T2, and another for the difference between 
T1 and T3.
 The first model provided a good overall fit to the data (In-
tercept = 24.55, detection = -24.15, condition C2 = 2.58, F(2, 
180) = 53.07, p < .001, R2 = .36). A detected manipulation was 
shown to be a significant predictor of the difference in rating 
(b = -0.60, SE = 2.35,  p < .001), while condition was not (b = 
0.06,  SE = 2.39, p = .281). The distributions of rating in T2 
in the direction of undetected M-trials for can be seen in Fig-
ure 6.
 The second model, examining differences between T1 
and T3, provided a good overall fit to the data (Intercept = 
13.14,  detection = -13.94, condition C2 = 0.96,  F(2, 180) = 
15.44,  p < .001, R2 = .13). As was found in the first model, a 
detected manipulation was shown to be a significant predic-
tor of the difference in rating (b = -0.38, SE = 2.51,  p < .001), 
while condition was not (b = 0.02, SE = 2.54, p = .707). The 
distributions of ratings in the direction of undetected M-trials 
can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 4. A box-and-whisker plot depicting the change in 
ratings for detected M-trials in the direction of the manipula-
tion. The box on the left illustrates the distribution of differ-
ence in ratings between T2 and T1, and the box on the right 
illustrates the distribution of differences in ratings between 
T3 and T1. The notches display a 95% confidence interval 
Figure 5. A box-and-whisker plot depicting the differences 
in  ratings  for non-detected M-trials, in the direction of the 
manipulation. The box on the left illustrates the difference 
minutes after CB and the box on the right  illustrates  the 
difference still  there a week later. The notches display a 95% 
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Figure 6. A box-and-whisker plot depicting the distributions 
of rating in the direction of the manipulation for M-trials  in 
T2. The blue (in grayscale: dark grey) boxes  illustrate the 
rating distributions for non-detected  trials, and the pink (in 
grayscale: light grey) boxes illustrate the rating distributions 
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Confidence
Regarding the participants’ confidence in their own attitudes, 
t-tests shows no significant difference in ratings for all trials 
between T1 and T2 (Mdiff = -0.53, 95% CI [-2.54, 1.48],  t370 = 
-0.51, p = .604, d = -0.02), T2 and T3 (Mdiff = 0.49, 95% CI 
[-1.29, 2.29], t371 = 0.54, p = .585, d = 0.02), and between T1 
and T3 (Mdiff = -0.03, 95% CI [-2.12, 2.06], t370 = -0.02, p = 
.977, d = -0.001).
Attitude reversals
Attitude reversal was defined as ratings crossing the mid-
point of the axis compared to the original (T1). In M-trials, 
attitude reversals were exhibited in 45% of T2 trials and in 
25% of T3 trials. In T2 for C1, 8% of the ratings for detected 
M-trials were attitude reversals, and 74% of the ratings the 
undetected M-trials were attitude reversals. In T2 for C2, 
11% of the ratings for detected M-trials were attitude rever-
sals, and 83% of the ratings for non-detected M-trials were 
attitude reversals (A Welch Two Sample t-test between these 
groups: Mdiff = 0.72, 95% CI [0.58, 0.85], t102.922 = 10.67, p < 
.001,  d = 2.06). Subdividing the M-trials into detected and 
non-detected, in T2 for both C1 and C2, 79% of the ratings 
for undetected M-trials were attitude reversals. In T3 for C1, 
10% of the ratings for detected M-trials were attitude rever-
sals, and 43% of ratings for the undetected M-trials were at-
titude reversals. In T3 for C2, 11% of ratings for detected M-
trials in were attitude reversals, while 35% of ratings for un-
detected M-trials were attitude reversals. In T3 for both C1 
and C2, 38% of the ratings for undetected M-trials were atti-
tude reversals. A proportions test on the ratings for unde-
tected M-trials between T2 in C1 and T2 in C2 shows no 
significant difference in the probabilities of attitude reversal 
between the two conditions (prop 1 = 0.74, prop 2 = 0.83, 
95% CI [-0.28, 0.10], X2= 0.63, p = .424). Neither does a 
proportions test on the ratings for the undetected manipulated 
trials between T3 in C1 and T3 in C2, (prop 1 = 0.43, prop 2 
= 0.35,  95% CI [-0.13,  0.30], X2 = 0.36, p = .544).  The dif-
ference between these proportions can be seen in Figure 8.
5 Discussion
The design of the current study was very similar to previous 
studies within the CB paradigm (Hall, Johansson & Strand-
berg,  2012; Hall et al., 2013; Taya et al., 2014) with the in-
tention that the data can be analysed and understood in the 
light of previous findings. When analysing the result of the 
main experiment of this thesis, four notable findings be-
comes apparent.
 The first finding is that the CB paradigm can be used to 
induce a significant attitude change regarding specific politi-
cal issues of high saliency within the same session as a CB 
manipulation. This finding is in line with what previous re-
search in the field has found (Johansson et al., 2014; Taya et 
al.,  2014; Pärnamets et alreak., 2015b). For the answers to 
the undetected manipulated trials in the first post-CB rating 
(T2), there was a substantial significant movement (26 mm) 
of the X in the direction of the manipulated answers. Com-
pared to in the first rating (T1), 78% of these answers were 
placed on the opposite side of the axis. For the non-
manipulated trials, the proportion of attitude reversals was 
12%. These results provide further strong support for longev-
ity of choice induced attitudes, as well as the validity of us-
ing the CB paradigm as a mean to influence and change peo-
ple’s attitudes regarding highly salient questions. In light of 
theories of decision-making,  the results provide support both 
for theories adhering to economic, as well as to a constructiv-
ist approaches, since 22% of the answers to previously unde-
tected manipulated questions in T2 still ended up on the 
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original side of the axis. This could of course be explained by 
a number of factors,  such as that some participants noticed a 
manipulation but did not bother to correct it, or that some 
participants did not understand how the axis worked. This is, 
however, always a possible confound, but one inherent in all 
empirical research reliant on interactions with people, and 
not specific to the CB paradigm.
 The second, and indeed the most notable finding is that 
the effect induced by CB and measured within the same ses-
sion as the manipulation, is still present and significant a 
week later. Although the total mean in ratings of previously 
undetected manipulated questions was 11 mm less than in the 
post-CB rating a week before,  the result is still significant, 
with 36% of the undetected M-trials still being attitude rever-
sals.
 This result stands in contrast to the one measured in Taya 
et al.  (2014), where no lasting preference change could be 
found. As to the reasons of these different results, one can 
think of a number of possible explanations. One possibility 
could be that there is an underlying difference in the nature 
of facial preference compared to political attitudes. However, 
there is no reason to assume that we for example would hold 
stronger attitudes toward faces than we do in politics. On the 
contrary, it is probably more reasonable to suppose that peo-
ple hold stronger and more deeply rooted attitudes regarding 
salient political issues than they do towards faces of un-
known individuals. An alternative possibility could be that it 
is much easier to subconsciously construct a coherent and 
convincing confabulation regarding a face, since a picture of 
a face is much more information-packed than a political 
statement, and thus this superior confabulation would result 
in a stronger attitude. This explanation assumes that we sub-
consciously construct confabulatory justifications, even if not 
verbally expressed, and would be hard to disprove. What is 
most likely however, and as stated in the introduction, is that 
Taya et al. (2014) did not find any effects due to the fact that 
they debriefed their participants prior to the last rating.
 The results found in the ratings in T3 provide strong sup-
port for the existence and longevity of attitudes induced 
through choice, and for the validity of using the CB para-
digm to influence and change peoples attitudes. The results 
also support the notion that the effects observed in the CB 
paradigm is not only an artefact inherent to the paradigm, 
raised by confusion or indifference within the participants 
regarding their own choice, but rather that these effects are 
real and lasting. These insights can open up for usage of the 
CB paradigm outside the laboratory to practical applications 
in for example therapeutic and commercial purposes.
 The third finding is that no significant effect between the 
post-CB ratings and the confabulation conditions was re-
corded. There are three possible explanations for this finding. 
The first explanation is that the strengthening effects of time 
spent thinking about an issue is not applicable to verbal rea-
soning as well, contrary to the conclusion drawn in the intro-
duction from the work of Petty and Cacioppo, (1986), Petty, 
Briñol,  and Tormala (2002), and by Clarkson, Tormala, and 
Leone (2011). If this happens to be true, it would lead to 
questions regarding the essential difference between silent 
reasoning and verbal reason. The second possibility is that 
there was some kind of flaw in the experiment that passed by 
unnoticed. One possible flaw could be that there was not 
enough difference between the two confabulation conditions 
to produce different effects. The third possible explanation is 
as simple as that not enough participants in the condition of 
minimal confabulation to provide a reliable result. However, 
in light of the results of this study, it seems that the length of 
confabulation does not influence the strength of a CB in-
duced attitudes.
 The fourth finding, not surprising in light of the finding 
just mentioned above, is that there was no significant differ-
ence in the participants’ rating of their own confidence in 
manipulated questions, both detected and undetected.  Fol-
lowing Clarkson, Tormala, and Leone (2011), there should 
have been an increase in confidence for participants who 
were allowed long confabulation, since only one participant 
spent more than 300 s on confabulations for a single ques-
tion.  Following from the same prediction,  there should have 
been a decrease in confidence for the participants who were 
only allowed the minimal confabulation length. One possible 
explanation for this could be that the participants did not 
fully grasp the point of the confidence axis.
General discussion
What the first two findings tells us is that choices can induce 
drastic changes in peoples’  preferences. By showing this 
without directly influencing the participants’ preferences 
(only their choices), the objection raised by Chen and Risen 
(2010) has been further rejected. This objection stated that 
what the FPC produced was not a real change in preferences, 
only a way to make visible already existing attitudes. Since 
Johansson et al. (2014) made it clear that CB can be seen as 
an updated version of the FCP, the fact that CB in the present 
study has been shown to induce preference reversals, this 
objection becomes even more unbelievable.
 Hall et al.  (2013) managed to, in a study similar to the 
current one, induce a remarkable change in voting intention 
of the participants, but not a reversal regarding specific is-
sues. By making visible that choice can change preferences 
for something as charged as highly salient specific political 
issues provides more evidence that choices can have a dra-
matic forming or altering effect on preferences and future 
choices. For half the undetected M trials in the present study, 
the participants consolidate these newly formed or altered 
preferences, and express them a week later.  This finding pro-
vides strong support for the constructivist view (Slovic, 
1995), which states that preferences are formed or altered in 
a specific task in a specific context, which in the present 
study would be during the interaction phase. There is a popu-
lar belief regarding the nature of preferences, which states 
that preferences are formed both in a specific context, as well 
as them something we carry with us (Hoeffler & Ariely, 
1999; Fischhoff, 1991). This view is supported by the com-
mon sense notion that we both can discern a pattern in our 
own and others behaviour, as well as that we and others have 
been known from time to time to change our minds. The 
finding in the current study that the participants overall were 
consistent in their choices does not, however, support the 
view that preferences are something we have over extended 
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periods of time (Slovic, 1995). This could as easily be ex-
plained by theories of self-perception, albeit an unconscious 
one. The fact that we act in an expected way in a certain 
situation could be explained by good recollection of how we 
previously acted in a similar situation.
 Apart from elucidating the power perceived choices can 
have on future choices and preferences, the current study has 
shown that,  in contrast to Taya et al. (2014), CB can be ap-
plied to induce attitude change. Previous studies of choice 
induced preference change not using CB have shown prefer-
ence reinforcement, rather than preference reversal.  In show-
ing that choice can induce temporally lasting preference re-
versals, the power of choice induced attitude change and 
FCP is shown to be even stronger than previously known. 
This study itself provides the first recorded evidence that the 
effects elicited by the CB paradigm has a temporal persis-
tence. It is also the first study to provide evidence that choice 
can induce a lasting preference reversal.
Limitations
For the present study, two limitations can be construed as 
having a large enough impact on the recorded data to warrant 
a discussion. These have to do with participants’ knowledge 
of the CB paradigm itself, and a flaw in the experiment.
 What seems plausible, and indeed has been noted previ-
ously in regards to Taya et al. (2014), is that knowledge of 
the CB paradigm and awareness that manipulations of one’s 
attitudes has taken place, should influence the effect an unde-
tected manipulation has on one’s attitudes. Since no time was 
available to study the veracity of the previous statement, this 
is also the biggest possible confound of the present study. 
The fact that the participants were recruited at the LUX 
building, sometimes in groups, inevitably lead to the partici-
pants discussing their experiences of the first session of the 
experiment at some time between the two sessions. A possi-
ble scenario could be that one participant who detected the 
manipulations asked other participants who did not detect the 
manipulations if their X’s also moved around, which could in 
turn lead to a higher rate of retrospective detection. This con-
found was not controlled for in this study since no possible 
way to do it was conceived. However, this confound is not 
thought to have any effect on the reliability of the recorded 
data, only on the effect the manipulations and treatments had 
on the attitude measured in T3. Since an effect still was 
found in T3, there is reason to suppose that when able to con-
trol for this confound,  the recorded effect of the manipulation 
should be even stronger.
 The second limitation, and the one with the largest impact 
on the recorded data and its reliability, really is more of a 
flaw in the experiment that went unnoticed through the entire 
experimental design process. This flaw becomes evident 
when reviewing the audio recordings of the confabulations. 
Apparently, and in retrospect not surprisingly, people are not 
very good at giving a precise estimations in per cents as to 
where an X is drawn on an unlabelled horizontal axis, result-
ing in their estimations sometimes being off by more than 10 
per cent. Consequently, the participants will base their argu-
mentation justifying their X on where on the scale they esti-
mate their X to be, not where it in fact is. Therefore, one can 
argue that the comparison in the analysis should have been 
between where the participants put their X in T2 and T3, and 
between where they believed they put it during the interac-
tion phase. If this analysis would have yielded a very differ-
ent result is unclear, since it is uncertain whether the choices 
the participants make in T2 and T3 are mostly influenced by 
their own verbal reports or by their recollection of the posi-
tion of the X they encounter in the interaction phase. Due to, 
and in light of this limitation or flaw, the result presented 
above is possibly not as fair or accurate as it could have 
been.
6 Conclusion and future investigations
In this thesis,  it has been shown that choices have the power 
to induce temporally lasting attitude reversals. It has also 
been shown that the Choice Blindness paradigm are able to 
induce a lasting political attitude change. This is the first re-
corded evidence in support of the CB paradigm possessing 
this capability. Knowledge of this capability not only support 
the notion that the effects recorded in a CB setting are some-
thing else than just an artefact of the experimental paradigm 
in itself, it opens up for meaningful use of CB in previously 
unexplored areas of research.
 There are many possible objects for future investigation 
in light of the results presented above. The most obvious one 
would be to carry out an extended replication of the main ex-
periment for this thesis, in which the delay between session 1 
and session 2 should be longer than 7 days, to find if there is 
some temporal limit for the manipulations. This would make 
it possible to see if all manipulated attitudes eventually fade 
away, or if some stick, and in the case of some attitudes 
sticking, conduct further investigations into possible reasons 
for this.
 Another interesting object for future research would be to 
investigate the effect participants’ knowledge of possible 
manipulations has on temporal attitude change in CB. These 
effects are not obvious if one looks at advertising as a way to 
manipulate people. It is well know that the expected effect of 
advertising is to change the behaviour of those exposed to it, 
but it still works. So the question remain to what extent CB 
induced attitude change can be expected to work on people 
with knowledge of the paradigm itself.
 A third possible, and highly interesting, object of future 
investigation would be to conduct a study directed towards 
trying to find transferability between answers to singular 
statements regarding one area of interest and some kind of 
measure regarding attitudes toward this area as a whole.  One 
could then perform CB on these singular statements to find if 
this would result in an attitude change toward the whole area.
 Lastly, in order to further validate the findings of this 
study, one could construct an experiment in which the effect 
of choice on attitude change is more clearly separated from 
the effect of confabulation. This experiment should incorpo-
rate a control group in which no participants are exposed to a 
CB manipulation. Instead, during the interaction phase, this 
group should get to argue for what they did not chose. If this 
would not produce an attitude change, there is even stronger 
reason to believe that choice indeed can induce lasting atti-
tude change.
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APPENDIX A
Stimuli statements used in Pilot 2. Below each statement is a translation of the statement to English.
Huruvida specialistsjukvården bör förstatligas är en viktig fråga.
“Whether specialist medical care should be nationalized is an important question”
En eventuell återförstatling av skolan är en viktig fråga.
“A possible re-nationalization of the school is an important question”
Fridlysandet av rödlistade djurarter, såsom ål och rödspätta, är en viktig fråga.
“Protection by law of redlisted species, such as eel and plaice, is an important question”
Lämplighetsbedömningen av personal inom sjukvård och hemtjänst är en viktig fråga.
“Susability assessments of staff in medical care and home care is an important question”
En utvärdering av det fria skolvalet är en viktig fråga.
“An evaluation of the free school choice is an important question”
Subventionering av energisnåla vitvaror är en viktig fråga.
“Subsidization of energy efficient kitchen appliances is an important question”
Tandvårdens relation till den allmänna sjukvården är en viktig fråga.
“The dental care’s relation to the universal medical care is an important question”Läxhjälp(hemma(för(alla(grundskoleelever(är(en(viktig(fråga.
“Help with homework for all elementary school pupils is an important question”
Bensinskatten är en viktig fråga.
“The gasoline tax is an important question”
Lönenivån för sjuksköterskor är en viktig fråga.
“The wage level for nurses is an important question”
Lärarutbildningarnas struktur och kvalitet är en viktig fråga.
“The structure and quality of the teacher education is an important question”
Statlig subvention av miljöfordon är en viktig fråga.
“State subsidises of green vehicles is an important question”
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APPENDIX B
Stimuli statements used in the choice blindness pilot and in the main experiment. Below each 
statement is a translation of the statement to English. Statements written in italics were used as 
target statements for manipulations in the main experiment.
Staten bör subventionera inköp av moderna och mer energieffektiva vitvaror. Dessa subventioner 
skulle finansieras av en punktskatt på föråldrad och ur energisynpunkt ineffektiv teknik.
“The government should subsidize purchases of energy efficient major household appliances. These subsidizes would 
be financed by an excise on out-dated and from an energy consumption perspective ineffective technology”
För att bibehålla den ekologiska mångfalden bör arter som rödlistas i samarbete med Internationella 
naturvårdsunionen (exempelvis ål, torsk, varg och kronhjort) fridlysas.
“In order to maintain the ecological diversity should species redlisted in collaboration with the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature be protected by law”
Sverige bör likt Norge införa fler ekonomiska och praktiska förmåner, exempelvis reducering av 
moms och trängselavgift, för personer som väljer att investera i el- och miljöbilar. Dessa förmåner 
kan finansieras av högre bensinskatt, samt högre skatt och moms på bilar som inte uppnår de 
utsläppsmål som krävs för att klassas som miljöbil.
“Sweden should, like Norway, introduce more economic and practical benefits, for example reduction of VAT and 
congestion tax, for people who chooses to invest in electric and green vehicles. These benefits can be financed by 
higher gasoline tax, as well as higher tax and VAT on vehicles which does not reach the emission goals required to be 
classified as a green vehicle”
Bensinskatten för privatpersoner bör baseras på folkbokföringsadress. För en person som 
exempelvis bor i en större stad med väl utbyggd kollektivtrafik (och således inte är lika beroende av 
bil) bör bensinskatten vara högre än för någon som bor på landsbygden. Detta bör inte inkludera 
företag i storstadsområden som är beroende av motorfordon.
“Gasoline tax for individual citizens should be based registered address. For a person who for instance lives in a larger 
city with a well-developed system for public transportation (and thus is not that dependent on a car), the gasoline tax 
should be higher than for a person who lives in a rural area. This should not include businesses in metropolitan areas 
that are dependent on motor vehicles”
För att garantera likvärdig vård över hela landet bör specialistsjukvården förstatligas istället för att 
drivas av de enskilda landstingen. Många mindre inrättningar skulle kunna stängas för att göra det 
enklare för vården att styras centralt, vilket också skulle resultera i färre, mer kraftfulla 
specialistvårdinrättningar med högre kapacitet.
“In order to guarantee equal care across the whole country, specialist medical care should be nationalized instead of 
being run by local authorities. A lot of smaller establishments could shut down in order to make it easier for the care to 
be run centrally, which in turn would result in fewer, more powerful specialist care establishments with higher capacity”
Tandvård bör vara fortsatt fristående från den allmänna sjukvården, förutsatt att 
högkostnadsskyddet sänks.
“Dental care should continues to be independent of universal health care, provided that the cost ceiling is lowered”
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Istället för att höja alla sjuksköterskors lön med en viss summa bör denna yrkesgrupp få en 
lagstadgad försäkran om en mer gynnsam löneutveckling över tid.
“Instead of raising all nurses pay a certain sum should this profession get a statutory declaration of a more favourable 
wage raise over time”
Lämplighetsbedömningar i form av intervjuer och personlighetstest för att undersöka empatisk 
förmåga och genuint intresse av omvårdnad bör vara obligatoriskt vid tillsättandet av tjänster inom 
sjukvård och hemtjänst.
“Suitability assessments in the form of interviews and personality tests in order to evaluate empathy and a genuine 
interest in nursing should be mandatory in appointments of services in health care and home care”
Den svenska grundskolan bör återförstatligas. Förutom att kommunerna skulle mista mycket, men 
inte allt, inflytande innebär ett återförstatligande att staten blir huvudman för skolan och övertar 
ansvaret för resursanslag, resurstilldelning och kvalitetsuppföljning. 
“The Swedish elementary school should be re-nationalized. Apart from the fact that local municipalities would loose 
much, albeit not all, influence, a re-nationalization would mean that the state becomes head of the school and assumes 
the responsibility for resource allocation and quality assurance”
Läxhjälp efter skoltid bör erbjudas av alla skolor och vara gratis för alla grundskoleelever oavsett 
skolresultat och familjesituation.
“Help with homework after school hours should be offered by all schools and be free for all elementary school students, 
irrespective of school results and family situation”
Det fria skolvalet bör begränsas till att endast kunna utnyttjas av elever som söker sig till 
utbildningar som inte erbjuds inom pendlingsavstånd från deras hemort.
“The free school choice should be limited only to be utilized by by students applying to educations not offered within a 
commuting distance from their home town”
Istället för höga lärarlöner är det framförallt andra egenskaper såsom kompetens, engagemang och 
personlig lämplighet som skapar förutsättningar för en framgångsrik grundskola. Genom att 
fokusera på dessa faktorer istället för en höjning av lärarlöner upptäcks och anställs bra lärare 
istället för personer som kan tänka sig att arbeta som lärare på grund av ekonomiskt intresse.
“Instead of high salaries for teachers, factors such as competence, commitment,  and personal suitability are the main 
conditions for creating a successful elementary school. By focusing on these factors instead of on raising salaries, good 
teachers will be discovered and hired, instead of people who can imagine working as a teacher because of economic 
interest”
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APPENDIX C
The two types of surveys (S1 and S2) used for post-CB ratings.
Sätt ett kryss på linjen som motsvarar hur du förhåller dig till frågan såväl som hur säker du är på 
din egen åsikt.
Grundskolebetyg från årskurs 4 är ett bra sätt att i god tid fånga upp elever som inte uppnår lärandemålen. 
Förutom att ge eleverna ett incitament att göra sitt bästa skulle dessa betyg också göra det lättare för 
lärare att kunna tillsätta extraåtgärder i syfte att hjälpa elever som inte uppnår målen.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Alla nyförlösta kvinnor bör få lov att stanna kvar på BB i tre nätter efter förlossningen. Till skillnad från 
hur det ser ut på många ställen runt om i landet bör även partnern bli erbjuden kostnadsfri övernattning i 
samma rum.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Den svenska grundskolan bör återförstatligas. Förutom att kommunerna skulle mista mycket, men inte 
allt, inflytande innebär ett återförstatligande att staten blir huvudman för skolan och övertar ansvaret för 
resursanslag, resurstilldelning och kvalitetsuppföljning. 
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
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Varje år används uppemot en miljon försöksdjur i Sverige. Bland annat i syfte att testa eventuella 
hälsorisker hos nyproducerade läkemedel, tvättmedel och rengöringsprodukter. På grund av etiska skäl 
bör alla försök på djur upphöra och ersättas med djurfria alternativ.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Tandvård bör vara fortsatt fristående från den allmänna sjukvården, förutsatt att högkostnadsskyddet 
sänks.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Läxhjälp efter skoltid bör erbjudas av alla skolor och vara gratis för alla grundskoleelever oavsett 
skolresultat och familjesituation.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Staten bör subventionera inköp av moderna och mer energieffektiva vitvaror. Dessa subventioner skulle 
finansieras av en punktskatt på föråldrad och ur energisynpunkt ineffektiv teknik.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
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Staten bör erbjuda friskvårdsbidrag till alla svenska medborgare. Detta friskvårdsbidrag ska täcka 80 % 
av kostanden för motions- och friskvårdsaktiviteter, till ett maxbelopp av 2000 kronor per år.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Alla skolor, sjukhus och vårdhem i Sverige bör endast erbjuda ekologiskt framställd mat. Utöver detta bör 
denna mat i så hög utsträckning som möjligt vara producerad i närheten av var den serveras.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Bensinskatten för privatpersoner bör baseras på folkbokföringsadress. För en person som exempelvis
bor i en större stad med väl utbyggd kollektivtrafik (och således inte är lika beroende av bil) bör 
bensinskatten vara högre än för någon som bor på landsbygden. Detta bör inte inkludera företag i 
storstadsområden som är beroende av motorfordon. 
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Sverige bör införa grundläggande programmering som en obligatorisk del av läroplanen i grundskolan. 
Förutom att detta skulle hjälpa unga individer att utveckla ett datalogiskt tänkande och strukturerat 
arbetssätt skulle det även förhoppningsvis hjälpa till att skapa en jämnare könsfördelning i IT-sektorn.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
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För att garantera likvärdig vård över hela landet bör specialistsjukvården förstatligas istället för att drivas 
av de enskilda landstingen. Många mindre inrättningar skulle kunna stängas för att göra det enklare för 
vården att styras centralt, vilket också skulle resultera i färre, mer kraftfulla specialistvårdinrättningar 
med högre kapacitet.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
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Sätt ett kryss på linjen som motsvarar hur du förhåller dig till frågan såväl som hur säker du är på 
din egen åsikt.
Staten bör erbjuda friskvårdsbidrag till alla svenska medborgare. Detta friskvårdsbidrag ska täcka 80 % 
av kostanden för motions- och friskvårdsaktiviteter, till ett maxbelopp av 2000 kronor per år.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Alla skolor, sjukhus och vårdhem i Sverige bör endast erbjuda ekologiskt framställd mat. Utöver detta bör 
denna mat i så hög utsträckning som möjligt vara producerad i närheten av var den serveras.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Läxhjälp efter skoltid bör erbjudas av alla skolor och vara gratis för alla grundskoleelever oavsett 
skolresultat och familjesituation.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Alla nyförlösta kvinnor bör få lov att stanna kvar på BB i tre nätter efter förlossningen. Till skillnad från 
hur det ser ut på många ställen runt om i landet bör även partnern bli erbjuden kostnadsfri övernattning i 
samma rum.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
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Staten bör subventionera inköp av moderna och mer energieffektiva vitvaror. Dessa subventioner skulle 
finansieras av en punktskatt på föråldrad och ur energisynpunkt ineffektiv teknik.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Sverige bör införa grundläggande programmering som en obligatorisk del av läroplanen i grundskolan. 
Förutom att detta skulle hjälpa unga individer att utveckla ett datalogiskt tänkande och strukturerat 
arbetssätt skulle det även förhoppningsvis hjälpa till att skapa en jämnare könsfördelning i IT-sektorn.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
För att garantera likvärdig vård över hela landet bör specialistsjukvården förstatligas istället för att drivas 
av de enskilda landstingen. Många mindre inrättningar skulle kunna stängas för att göra det enklare för 
vården att styras centralt, vilket också skulle resultera i färre, mer kraftfulla specialistvårdinrättningar 
med högre kapacitet.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Bensinskatten för privatpersoner bör baseras på folkbokföringsadress. För en person som exempelvis
bor i en större stad med väl utbyggd kollektivtrafik (och således inte är lika beroende av bil) bör 
bensinskatten vara högre än för någon som bor på landsbygden. Detta bör inte inkludera företag i 
storstadsområden som är beroende av motorfordon. 
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
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Varje år används uppemot en miljon försöksdjur i Sverige. Bland annat i syfte att testa eventuella 
hälsorisker hos nyproducerade läkemedel, tvättmedel och rengöringsprodukter. På grund av etiska skäl 
bör alla försök på djur upphöra och ersättas med djurfria alternativ.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Den svenska grundskolan bör återförstatligas. Förutom att kommunerna skulle mista mycket, men inte 
allt, inflytande innebär ett återförstatligande att staten blir huvudman för skolan och övertar ansvaret för 
resursanslag, resurstilldelning och kvalitetsuppföljning. 
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Tandvård bör vara fortsatt fristående från den allmänna sjukvården, förutsatt att högkostnadsskyddet 
sänks.
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
Grundskolebetyg från årskurs 4 är ett bra sätt att i god tid fånga upp elever som inte uppnår lärandemålen. 
Förutom att ge eleverna ett incitament att göra sitt bästa skulle dessa betyg också göra det lättare för 
lärare att kunna tillsätta extraåtgärder i syfte att hjälpa elever som inte uppnår målen. 
Håller inte [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Håller
  alls med                            helt med
    Hur säker känner du dig på din åsikt i den här frågan?
   Extremt [0%]–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[100%]      Extremt
    osäker                              säker
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